Does a financial crisis

make consumers increasingly prudent? by Noordegraaf-Eelens, L.H.J. (Liesbeth) & Franses, Ph.H.B.F. (Philip Hans)
1 
 
 Does a financial crisis  
make consumers increasingly prudent? 
 
Econometric Institute Report 2014-16 
 
Liesbeth Noordegraaf-Eelens 
Philip Hans Franses 
 
Erasmus School of Economics 
Erasmus University College 
 
Abstract 
Given the enormous impact of the 2007-2010 worldwide financial crisis on societies, one may 
wonder what the impact was on individual consumer behavior concerning financial products 
and services. A natural expectation would be that the crisis made people aware of the risks 
and consequently that they should become increasingly prudent when their own finances are 
at stake. Prudency can appear in gathering more information, more frequently asking for 
advice and higher reluctance to buy higher risk and unknown products. In this paper we hold 
statements of recent buyers of financial products and services against those of a representative 
group of already long term owners of financial decision makers.  
Interestingly, based upon detailed data covering the period 2007-2013 we find only 
small differences between recent closers and the representative group. In fact, in most cases 
these differences point towards less prudent behavior. Moreover, we find that these 
differences cannot be explained by GDP growth. We also find that higher educated consumers 
show more prudence.  In sum, we document that consumer behavior is relatively indifferent to 
changes at a macroeconomic level.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2007 to 2010 financial crisis left its mark. It was covered by much media attention, and 
professionals working in the financial sector received much criticism. Policy measures were 
taken to prevent a next crisis, and the crisis generated much unbeneficial spin off at a societal 
as well as at personal levels. Examples of this impact are the European sovereign debt crises, 
slowly recovering economies, rising unemployment rates, pension funds getting in danger 
zones, and severe losses on the housing market. In this paper we examine the potential 
consequences of the financial crisis at a more individual level and we examine whether the 
crisis left its mark upon the attitudes of consumers of financial products and services. More 
specifically, is there a difference between what consumers say they will do and how they 
actually act. Within public debates it has been repeatedly stated that confidence in the 
financial sector shrank (Roth, 2009). Hence we may expect that consumers are aware of the 
risks related to the financial sector, and consequently, we would expect that the attitude of 
consumers has become increasingly prudent.  
Rephrasing Kerja & Slovic (2012), we thus wonder how consumers of financial 
products and services ‘behave in this new, uncertain, and more dangerous environment?’ 
Have they become more prudent – as could be expected – or not? This question addresses the 
larger issue of the interaction between macro and micro effects (Fizel & Johnson, 1986; 
Beugelsdijk, 2006; Uslaner, 2008), and we address  whether macroeconomic fluctuations 
have an impact on micro-level individual consumer behavior  (Johnson & Tversky, 1983) 
would assume an indirect relationship, where they show that events at a societal level can 
have an impact upon personal attitude and behavior, with  awareness being sufficient for 
adjusting attitudes. However, the direction of the effect is not the same in all circumstances. 
Depending on intensity and framing of information, there will be either amplification or 
attenuation of risk.  
This line of thought is contested by Malmendier & Nagel (2011) and Tyler & Cook 
(1984), where these authors stress the importance of firsthand experience as a mediator 
between macro changes and micro effects. As long as societal phenomena are aligned with 
personal experiences, attitude change is expected to happen, and otherwise no significant 
effect will appear (Malmendier & Nagel, 2011). This latter result is associated with the 
impersonal impact hypothesis (Tyler & Cook, 1984). According to this hypothesis phenomena 
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at a macro societal level do not have a significant impact upon personal attitudes, that is, they 
affect at most the attitude towards societal issues.  
Summarizing, within academic research there is debate on whether or not direct 
experiences are needed for a change in attitude. The recent financial crisis created a general 
awareness of risk related to the financial domain, and hence we expect that attitudes towards 
financial products and services should change. In our study we compare the statements and 
behavior of recent buyers of financial products and services with a representative group of 
financial decision makers. As such, we focus on the potential differences between firsthand 
decision makers – the recent buyers – and a group who made their decisions at an earlier 
moment.  We also consider the potential mediating role of education levels, where we expect 
that for higher educated individuals the difference between earlier and recent financial 
decision makers is smaller.   
 Our study examines the attitude and behavior of consumers of financial products and 
services concerning the financial market in the Netherlands, where we analyze data on 
consumer attitudes in the period 2007 -2013. This period can be characterized by a number of 
changes and developments at the macroeconomic as well as the microeconomic level.  In 
2007 the crisis was hardly visible within the Netherlands. Macroeconomic forecasts published 
by the Dutch Central Planning Bureau (CPB) were optimistic in those days.  In 2007, the 
overall perspective was positive as a substantial economic growth combined with a decrease 
in unemployment was foreseen (CPB, 2007). At a macroeconomic level pessimism enters in 
the beginning of 2009, a couple of months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
September 2008 (CPB, 2009; CPB, 2008). The macroeconomic prospects published in the 
Spring of 2009 indicated that growth is expected to be negative, that unemployment will 
increase towards 8.75% in 2010 (CPB, 2010).  Macroeconomic prospects, published in 
September 2009, were not much better. In addition to macroeconomic developments there is 
the bankruptcy of the Belgian-Dutch Fortis Bank. The Dutch government intervenes with a 
bailout to prevent a system breakdown. The Fortis bank is the first one but not the last one to 
get itself and the financial markets into trouble as it was to be followed by ING, DSB and 
SNS. Next to pessimistic prospects at a macro level, and problems within the financial sector, 
the housing market got stuck. Housing prices tumble down and consequently house owners 
have to deal with underwater mortgages and take losses when they want to sell their houses. 
During this period discussions on a European Sovereign debt crisis started to appear on front 
pages of national newspapers. All in all it then becomes clear that the financial sector 
generates substantial risk at a macro level as well as at a micro level. After a dip in 2009, the 
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outlook became positive again, although the forecasted growth remains small. In 2012 the 
actual growth is negative, but future prospects remain positive. 
 To gain insight in the consumer attitudes on the Dutch financial market, we use data 
from the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). Since 2006 an independent 
market research firm commissioned by the AFM has conducted online surveys on individual 
consumers. The questionnaires cover topics related to loans, mortgages, and investments. 
Between 2007 and 2013 the same questions have been included with respect to consumer 
attitudes and levels of education and this makes a comparison across the years possible. The 
questions cover information gathering, decision making, product choice, sharing 
responsibility and judgment on the organization of the market. Bi-annually between 1000 and 
1600 respondents participated in this consumer panel. The data will allow us to examine 
whether or not attitudes have changed within this time span. The data also allow for making a 
distinction between those who are closely involved – recent consumers of financial products 
and services – and those who acquired the products at an earlier stage before the crisis.  
The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM) is one of two supervisors 
within the Dutch Twin Peak model. Together with the Dutch Central Bank (“De 
Nederlandsche Bank”, DNB) it takes care of supervision in the Dutch financial sector. The 
Central Bank focuses on financial institutions, and takes care of prudential supervision. It 
functions as a safeguard to financial stability and monetary policy, and it provides the 
government with economic advice. The AFM focuses on the relationship between financial 
consumers and financial institutions. Hence, this supervisor is responsible for regulating 
behavior within the financial sector. The AFM was founded in 2002 as a successor to the 
Dutch Securities Board.  
 Our study complements other research focusing on changes in attitude within the 
financial sector. Barberis (2013) relates the financial crisis to behavioral finance by studying 
over-extrapolation and belief manipulation. Hoffmann et al. (2013) examine the change in 
individual investor perceptions and behavior during the crisis. They find significant 
fluctuations of investor perceptions during the crisis and a recovery of perceptions towards the 
end of the crisis. Glaser & Weber (2005) examine the influence of the 9/11 tragedy. They 
conclude that individual investors’ expectations recover fast. Investors expect mean reversion 
after the crisis. Their volatility estimates are higher, and hence there is less overconfidence, 
and differences of opinions with regard to return forecasts are lower, whereas differences of 
opinions concerning volatility forecasts are unaffected. Our study focuses on consumers of 
financial products and not on investors and allows for differences across owners of financial 
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products and services and consumers of financial products and services. In contrast to earlier 
research, we do not focus on professionals but on individual consumers. 
Our paper can be positioned as a contribution to behavioral finance (Thaler & Sunstein, 
2008).The goal of this domain of research is to design innovations that can improve the 
financial outcomes of individuals. Although it is not clear whether or not an increasingly 
prudent attitude will pay off financially, a claim can be made that an increasingly prudent 
attitude is wanted both at a micro and a macro level. At an individual level a prudent attitude 
can lead to better, more beneficial, decision making. It can therefore contribute to an 
improved awareness of uncertainties related to financial products and services, and a possible 
safety net to deal with these uncertainties. At a macro level a prudent attitude can become a 
countervailing power, it can put the sector under ongoing pressure to perform in a prudent and 
professional way. Our research elaborates on the question whether a more prudent attitude is 
self evident or needs a design. If consumers develop a prudent attitude themselves no 
additional measures are needed per se. However, if they do not develop that attitude, then 
other actors like government institutions, financial institutions, educational institutions or 
legal institutions are required to come up with a prudency stimulating design.  
 Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present our theoretical 
framework. Mediators like indirect or firsthand experiences are discussed and transformed 
into indirect and firsthand decision making. Furthermore, we take education levels into 
account as higher educated people may not need a firsthand experience to draw proper 
conclusions. Subsequently, we will translate the difference between indirect and first hand 
experiences towards indirect and firsthand application. The latter represents a group that has 
to apply newly gathered knowledge immediately and this group is of our focal interest. The 
section ends with an overview of hypotheses to be tested below. The third section contains a 
specification of data and methodology and the fourth section summarizes the results. In the 
last section we address the main question of our study, which is “Did consumer attitudes on 
personal finance products and services become increasingly prudent in the period 2007 to 
2013?” , and its two related questions which are: “Is there a difference between consumers 
who have to act and those who only have to consider the possibility of acting?” and  “Is there 
a difference in attitude between higher and lower educated people?”  Finally, the 
consequences of our findings for theory, research and policy are discussed. 
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2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 
The general discussion concerns the interaction between events at a macro level and attitudes 
at a micro level. The more focused discussion concerns the interaction between the financial 
crisis (macro) and the personal attitudes towards financial products and services (micro). This 
section contains an outline of the theoretical discussions in related research. It is our intention 
to examine the difference between consumers who actually have to decide and between those 
who hypothetically decide, so between actual and virtual attitudes. The first group has a 
firsthand experience as the decision actually has to be made, whereas the representative 
benchmark group has an indirect “as if experience”. Based upon the literature of indirect and 
direct experiences we will formulate hypotheses. Following that, precise indicators to grasp 
changes at a macro and a micro level are presented. The section ends with an overview of the 
hypotheses to be tested next.  
 
2.1 Firsthand or indirect experiences and decisions 
In their article “Depression Babies: Do Macroeconomic Experiences affect Risk Taking” 
Malmendier & Nagel (2011) conclude that individuals who have experienced low market 
returns lower their willingness to take risks. Additionally, they are less likely to participate in 
the stock market, invest a lower fraction of their liquid assets in stocks and are more 
pessimistic about future stock returns. Their research, covering a period from 1960 to 2007, 
shows a relationship between macroeconomic events and personal attitudes, that is, if 
individuals experience losses, they will become increasingly prudent with respect to  loss. The 
relationship between personal experience of loss and attitude change is also studied by 
Loewenstein et al. (2001) as well as by Thaler & Johnson (1990). The latter authors confirm 
that sunk costs – losses made – lower willingness to take risks. Related to the financial crisis 
as well as the Dutch market the influence of change in attitudes through firsthand experiences 
has been confirmed in (Van der Cruijsen, De Haan, & Jansen, 2013). 
The impersonal impact hypothesis approaches the relationship between macro events 
and micro attitude change from a different angle (Tyler & Cook, 1984). According to this 
hypothesis, events affect the level where they are situated. Personal and societal level 
judgments are distinct and separate, that is, people will not draw personal implications from 
their general views about the world (Tyler & Cook, 1984, p. 705). As these authors write: 
“Societal level judgments refer to beliefs about the larger community and the condition of the 
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community residents in relation to some social phenomenon […], personal level judgments 
refer to beliefs about the respondents own estimated risk of being victimized […]” (Tyler & 
Cook, 1984, p. 693). When applied to the financial crisis this would mean that possible losses 
during a financial crisis, without experiencing actual losses, will not alter the risk perception 
at a personal level and hence prudency is not expected to increase.  
In earlier research Tyler (1980) counters the assumption that firsthand experiences 
have greater influence compared to indirect experiences Indirect experiences can include both 
informal social communication as well as mass media experiences (Tyler, 1980). A positive 
relationship between (over)exposure and the perception of risk is examined by Lichtenstein et 
al. (1978). Their research shows how people have a biased judgment on the frequency of 
death from several causes. The biases are related to a couple of sources, and these are 
disproportionate exposure, memorability, or imaginability of various events. While firsthand 
experiences may be involved – through memory – this is not necessarily the case. Kasperson 
et al. (1988) nuance and elaborate upon the way the affect shows itself. Both the amplification 
and attenuation of risk are possible.  
Although both perspectives are presented as opposites, this is not necessarily the case. 
Weinstein’s position combines both views (Weinstein, 1989). On the one hand prudence and 
prevention after a disaster can be viewed as evidence of firsthand experiences. And on the 
other hand the failure of people to take precautions can also be attributed to firsthand 
experience or non experience, “because the lesson we learn about most hazards is that they do 
not happen to us” (Weinstein, 1989, p. 31). Or, by paraphrasing Weinstein, people will be 
reluctant to evacuate if the previous storm was not severe (Weinstein, 1989, p. 32). When 
relating these findings to our study we can conclude that opinions differ on whether or not 
there will be differences between those consumers with indirect and with direct experiences. 
So, according to some research there will be no difference between the group of recent buyers 
and the representative group, while according to other research there will be difference. The 
aim of our research therefore is to find out of “if”, and “what kind of” differences occur.  
Another overarching perspective that offers the opportunity to combine both 
perspectives is through Slovic’s concreteness principle, that is “a judge or decision maker 
tends to use only the information that is explicitly displayed in the stimulus object, and will 
use it only in the form in which it is displayed” (Thaler & Johnson, Gambling with the house 
of money and trying to break even: The effects of prior outcomes on risky choice, 1990, p. 
646; Slovic, 1972). So, in contrast to what is standard rational or bounded rational reasoning, 
individuals do not use all available historical data, but they use a selection of it (Malmendier 
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& Nagel, 2011). The form in which this selection of data is displayed further determines 
possible reactions to them, as has also been shown by Kahneman & Tversky (1984; 1979), 
Kahneman (1992) and by Janis & Feshbach (1953). Using the perspective of framing leaves 
room for firsthand experiences and for indirect experiences.  
A final factor to address is the inverse relationship to be found between risk perception 
and the probabilities of winning, see Slovic et al. (2002, p. 335) . People base their judgments 
not only on what they think, but also on what they feel “if they like an activity, they are 
moved to judge the risks as low and the benefits as high” (Slovic et al, 2007)  In that case a 
change in attitude is dependent upon whether or not there is a change in the perception of the 
benefits. The expectation is that based on the financial crisis a change in the benefits affiliated 
with the activities on financial markets is to be expected.   
 
2.2 Indicators for macro-economic events and changes in attitude on a micro level 
The next step in our research is to define indicators for changes at a macro as well as at a 
micro level. At a macro level we look for indicators that express a change in macroeconomic 
perspectives. It should be indicators that are actively communicated to the public as only in 
that case it can be expected to influence the awareness.  The Dutch Central Planning Bureau 
(CPB) offers biannual prospects that present macroeconomic expectations and realizations. 
Their forecasts are presented two times a year and always receive a considerable amount of 
media attention. Furthermore, they are used as input for government policy. The indicator to 
be used here is expected GDP growth. In the media this indicator is prominent as it seems to 
offer an overall perspective upon the state of affairs and future perspectives. We collect the 
GDP forecasts from various CPB reports (CPB: 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013).  
Next to that, important events, landmarks, within the time span of research can be used. 
These are the fall of Lehman Brothers (September 2008), the government bail outs of Fortis 
(September-October 2008), ING (October 2008) and SNS real (November 2008), as well as 
the bankruptcy of DSB (October 2009). These events justify our specific focus on 2008, 2009 
and 2010. Considering the impact of these events, which required the Dutch government to 
invest considerable amounts of money in the financial sector and they generated a substantial 
amount of media attention, it can be assumed that they contributed to the awareness of risk in 
the financial world. 
 At a micro level we look for indicators that express a change in attitude. In order to 
find out whether or not there is a difference between recent closers and the representative 
group of earlier financial decision makers, attitudes of both groups will be compared.  A first 
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straightforward observation of whether or not consumer attitude changed towards more 
prudency can be found in the preferences for products. Do they prefer products with a 
different risk profile or not?  
Additionally we will examine the decision making process by consumers of financial 
products and services. To deal with increased uncertainty, due to the financial crisis, 
consumers could try to find out either more themselves (Weinstein, 1989) or gather advice 
from third parties. So, additional indicators for changes in attitudes are the amount of time 
spent in looking for information and the consultation of professional or lay – family/friends - 
parties. The choice of these indicators is backed up by research on advice seeking. This 
research shows that expert contributions lead to more accurate decision making (Yaniv, 2004; 
Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). The effect is the largest if multiple uncorrelated opinions are 
combined (Yaniv, 2004). However consumers do not only ask for advice to improve their 
decisions, but also out of social reasons – to accept help -, and to share responsibility (Harvey 
& Fischer, 1997). The willingness to share responsibility is found to be increasingly important 
when the risk associated with the decision is high (Harvey & Fischer, 1997). So, based upon 
this research it can be expected that the amount of information gained by the consumer itself 
or through asking advice will increase. This research does not specify which of both of the 
information sources is more consulted, that is, professional or lay advisors. Harvey & Fischer 
(1997) concluded that lay-consumers see themselves as capable of making reasonably good 
judgments. However, they perceive good judgment to be so cognitively demanding that they 
normally decide to place heavy reliance on their advisors’ views. Only when judgments are 
particularly important do they decide to carry out the additional mental work needed to avoid 
this reliance. This suggests that novices should place less reliance on advisors and be less 
influenced by advisors’ level of expertise when judgments are important. So, we expect that 
the amount of information they gather will increase. However it cannot be said on beforehand 
whether consumers will gather more information themselves or trust more upon professional 
as well as non professional advisors.  
 A final indicator that matters is personal characteristics. The indicator that will be used 
here is the level of education. The expectation is that higher-educated consumers are better 
able to relate macro events to micro circumstances, even if they did not experience the event 
firsthand. Hence, this group behaves more in accordance with rational or bounded rational 
behavior. The importance of education can also be found in the literature on advice seeking 
and advice accepting (Yaniv, 2004; Bailey, Kumar, & Ng, 2011; Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; 
Glaser & Weber, 2005). Yaniv (2004) found that more knowledgeable individuals improved 
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their decision based upon advice, that is, their accuracy increased, but it was not optimal yet. 
This is also due to the fact that higher educated people on the one hand look for more advice, 
but on the other hand also stick more to their own opinions. Heath & Tversky (1991) refer to 
this as the competence hypothesis, that is, people prefer betting on their own judgments over 
an equal-probable chance event when they consider themselves knowledgeable, but not 
otherwise (Heath & Tversky, 1991). So, although it is not clear whether or not higher 
educated individuals will follow up the advice, an increase in information gathering and 
advice seeking can be expected.   
 
2.3 Hypotheses 
The statistical hypothesis to be tested is that the financial crisis leaves the attitudes of 
consumers unaffected, that is, they become neither more, nor less prudent. Related to the 
focus on personal finances, advice and products, this hypothesis is related to eight, research 
based, statements in the AFM survey  (Zijlstra, 2012; Nipo, 2004). These are: 
- Consumers will neither gather more, nor less information; 
- Consumers will neither spend more, nor less time on acquiring a financial product or 
service: 
- Consumers will neither trust more, nor less upon the professional advisor;  
- Consumers will neither ask for more, nor for less lay  advice;  
- Consumers will neither prefer products with less risk, nor with more risk; 
- Consumers will neither heighten, nor lower their level of aspiration when looking for 
products and services (the aspiration level is linked to striving for the best product);  
- Consumers will be neither more willing, nor less willing to share responsibilities with 
providers of financial products. 
- Consumers will be neither more willing, nor less willing to share responsibilities with the 
government. 
 
For these statistical hypotheses we will consider the difference between recent buyers of 
financial products and services and a representative benchmark group of earlier financial 
decision makers; additionally we will examine, for both groups, whether or not the level of 
education has a significant influence upon the outcome. Explanations as to why the 
hypothesis is rejected or not can, according to the literature, be guided by the firsthand or 
indirect experience, or by the framing of the situation or the benefits. 
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3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Data 
Since 2006 an independent market research firm commissioned by the AFM has conducted 
online surveys on members of a consumer panel on financial products and services. These 
panel sessions are scheduled in the first and the third quarter of the year. The questionnaire 
covers the following topics, that is, mortgages, pensions, investments, consumer credit, 
reputation AFM, and consumer attitudes. The focus of this paper is on the data gathered in the 
section on consumer attitudes, where the data cover 2007 to and including 2013. While other 
questions have been changed during the years, the questions on attitudes remained unchanged 
during this period. Four clusters that address attitudes can be distinguished: gathering 
information (1), decision making (2), products (3), and responsibility (4). All the questions are 
directly related to the decision making process. They concern the consumer as a decision 
maker and how they inform themselves (1), who they involve in their own process of decision 
making (2), what kind of products consumers prefer (3) and with whom consumers’ 
responsibility for the decision is shared (4).  
Respondents are distinguished in two groups: the buyers, who have acquired recently a 
financial product like a mortgage (and in some years consumer credit) and the representative 
benchmark group, a group representative for the Netherlands. The latter group already owns a 
financial product or service, and has made the relevant decision in an earlier stage. To make 
the dataset more representative the data of the representative group are weighted by weighting 
factors based on age, education, region, and so on. Because these weighting factors are 
missing for the buyers, these are not weighted.  Table 1 provides a summary of how the 
respondents are divided over buyers and the representative group, and education. 
 
Quarter Total respondents Buyers Representative benchmark group 
Total Educated Total Educated 
Low (%) Middle (%) High (%) Low (%) Middle (%) High (%) 
2007Q1 1474 941 6 29 65 533 10 27 63 
2007Q3 1348 775 12 35 52 573 21 32 47 
2008Q1 1224 600 13 31 56 624 18 27 56 
2008Q3 1723 867 19 36 44 856 30 39 30 
2009Q1 1308 802 18 43 39 506 36 40 25 
2009Q3 1341 890 23 44 34 451 36 39 25 
2010Q1 1341 887 19 41 40 454 35 39 26 
12 
 
2010Q3 1605 1195 20 41 39 410 36 30 34 
2011Q1 1607 1148 20 40 40 459 36 31 34 
2011Q3 1276 816 18 43 39 460 37 29 34 
2012Q1 1260 846 17 41 42 414 35 40 25 
2012Q3 1068 755 16 39 45 313 34 40 26 
2013Q1 1316 952 16 40 44 364 35 42 24 
2013Q3 1587 1018 17 37 46 569 34 43 24 
Table 1: The number of respondents, separated into buyers and a representative benchmark group and their levels of education 
 
3.2 Methodology 
In our study we use 8 statements, 2 for each cluster. The answers are sorted in order of 
prudence. How the variables are recoded can be seen in Table 2. 
 
Cluster Variable Less prudent More prudent 
1 Amount of information 1 (Limited information) 7 (Much information) 
1 Amount of time spent on decision 1 (Little time) 7 (A lot of time) 
2 Trust in professional advisor 1 (Much trust) 7 (Less trust) 
2 Asking for lay advice 1 (Less advice) 7 (More advice) 
3 Level of aspiration 1 (Acceptable product) 7 (Best product) 
3 Preference for products with risk 1 (More risk) 7 (Less risk) 
4 Share responsibility with providers 1 (Responsibility of consumer) 3 (Share) 
4 Share responsibility with government 1 (Responsibility of consumer) 3 (Share) 
Table 2: The used variables (statements) and how they are recoded 
First general increases and decreases in the answers are analyzed, separately for the 
buyers and the representative group. For each variable, the averages of the answers across the 
quarters in the years are regressed on a constant and a trend. Next, we regress these averages 
on current and two quarters lagged GDP growth (the forecasts of the CPB) and on the average 
response of two quarters ago. Furthermore, we investigate if higher and lower educated 
respondents show differences in prudent behavior. This is done separately for the buyers and 
the representative group. Because we make use of discrete variables, this is done by a Pearson 
Chi-Square test. Only the most extreme answers are used. For each variable the minimum 
answers are aggregated, for cluster (1), (2) and (3) these are the values 1 and 2. For cluster (4) 
this concerns the value 1. Also the maximum answers are aggregated, for cluster (1), (2) and 
(3) these are the values 6 and7. For cluster (4) this is the answer 3. The answers that are not in 
the minimum or maximum category are not used in this analysis. Also respondents that have a 
middle level of education are left out of the sample in this analysis. Under the statistical null 
hypothesis, there is no significant relation between education and prudent behavior, for each 
question. The total amount of respondents that give minimum and maximum answers is 
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assumed as given. As expected under the null hypothesis, in the group that answers less 
prudent (minimum answers) and the group that answers more prudent (maximum answers) 
the percentages of high and low education levels are the same. If there is a positive 
relationship between more prudent behavior and a higher level of education, the group that is 
high educated and answering more prudent, is (significant) larger than was expected under  
the null hypothesis. The opposite is true for a negative relationship. 
 
 
4. Results  
 
We present all the results in this section. First we look at the links between answers to 
statements with trends and GDP, and next, we focus on the level of education. 
 
4.1 Cluster 1 statements: gathering information 
The statements in Cluster 1 involve gathering information. When looking at the trends in the 
data, see Table 3, we see that both groups of consumers are less prudent when it comes to 
‘amount of information’, as the trend parameter is significant for both groups. Regarding 
‘amount of time spent on decision’, the trend for recent closers heads towards more prudency 
and the trend for the representative group of earlier financial decision makers heads towards 
less prudency, although neither of these trends is significant. If we relate the average answers 
to GDP growth we find that recent closers are in both cases increasingly prudent when GDP 
goes down, so in worse economic times more time is spent on acquiring a financial product. 
However, these correlations are not significant either.  
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 Independent variables 
  
Dependent variable 
Amount of information Amount of time spent on decision 
Buyers Representative group Buyers Representative group 
Intercept 4.90 0.81 5.00 2.07 4.84 1.11 4.84 6.24 
 (0.000) (0.457) (0.000) (0.184) (0.000) (0.407) (0.000) (0.002) 
Trend -0.05  -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.020)  (0.578)  
GDP growth  -0.01  -0.00  -0.02  0.01 
  (0.720)  (0.893)  (0.330)  (0.761) 
Autoregressive term  0.82  0.56  0.76  -0.30 
  (0.006)  (0.095)  (0.021)  (0.344) 
Lag of GDP growth  0.02  0.01  0.03  0.01 
  (0.460)  (0.675)  (0.141)  (0.702) 
R2 0.740 0.626 0.593 0.336 0.389 0.522 0.027 0.141 
Table 3: Regression results for the Cluster 1 statements: trends and relation with GDP growth. P-values are given in parentheses. ; 
highlighted means significant at a 5% level 
Table 4 shows that before the crisis (that is 2007) higher educated recent buyers were 
less prudent than lower educated recent buyers both for the ‘amount of information’ and the 
‘amount of time spent on decision’. For the representative benchmark group there is no 
significant difference between higher and lower educated participants before the crisis, both 
for information gathering and time spent. In the heyday of the crisis higher educated people 
are slightly more prudent. However, in the aftermath of the crisis we find that within the 
representative group higher educated people are more prudent, again for both amount of 
information and time spent. Within the group of recent buyers the significant differences 
towards a more prudent attitude for higher educated people are to be found in the third quarter 
of 2011 and the third quarter of 2013. In almost all other quarters, higher educated closers 
seem to be more prudent, although the differences are not statistically significant. So, it seems 
that higher educated people in the representative group have learned their lessons from the 
crisis. However it is questionable if or to what extent they really will act in a more prudent 
way. 
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Quarter Amount of information Amount of time spent on decision 
 Buyers Representative group Buyers Representative group 
2007Q1 - (0.061) - (0.390) - (0.044) + (0.223) 
2007Q3 + (0.228) + (0.478) + (0.595) + (0.860) 
2008Q1 + (0.453) + (0.328) + (0.271) - (0.598) 
2008Q3 + (0.211) + (0.006) - (0.947) + (0.059) 
2009Q1 + (0.486) + (0.578) - (0.177) - (0.283) 
2009Q3 + (0.124) + (0.720) - (0.692) + (0.235) 
2010Q1 + (0.372) + (0.083) + (0.603) + (0.031) 
2010Q3 + (0.171) + (0.470) + (0.073) + (0.348) 
2011Q1 - (0.553) + (0.198) - (0.799) + (0.252) 
2011Q3 + (0.058) + (0.171) + (0.238) + (0.888) 
2012Q1 + (0.348) + (0.587) + (0.241) + (0.142) 
2012Q3 - (0.971) + (0.079) - (0.145) + (0.077) 
2013Q1 + (0.845) + (0.209) + (0.540) + (0.074) 
2013Q3 + (0.026) + (0.022) + (0.232) + (0.110) 
Table 4: Relation between statements and education for the cluster 1 statements; + = high educated people are more prudent, - = high 
educated people are less prudent; two sided p-values are given in parentheses, highlighted = + and significant at one-sided 5% level, hatched 
= - and significant at one-sided 5% level 
 
4.2 Cluster 2 statements: decision making 
The Cluster 2 statements involve decision making. Table 5 illustrates that recent buyers and 
the members of the representative group become less prudent when it comes to trusting 
professional advisors, that is, they trust professional advisors more easily. The trend for the 
representative group is significant. When it comes to the consultation of friends and family for 
both groups, recent closers are less prudent while the representative group is more prudent. 
However, this trend is insignificant. Both averages across the years are not significantly 
related to GDP, neither for buyers nor for the representative group. So, the macroeconomic 
situation does not seem to be of influence to the attitude of both groups towards their 
professional and lay advisors.  
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 Independent variables 
  
Dependent variable 
Trust in professional advisor Asking lay advice 
Buyers Representative group Buyers Representative group 
Intercept 4.45 5.88 4.75 2.19 3.73 4.04 3.90 3.85 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.132) (0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.031) 
Trend -0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.01  
 (0.461)  (0.018)  (0.243)  (0.355)  
GDP growth  0.00  -0.01  -0.02  0.01 
  (0.802)  (0.580)  (0.421)  (0.614) 
Autoregressive term  -0.33  0.53  -0.11  0.02 
  (0.361)  (0.095)  (0.756)  (0.951) 
Lag of GDP growth  -0.01  0.01  0.02  -0.02 
  (0.626)  (0.469)  (0.446)  (0.317) 
R2 0.047 0.120 0.398 0.303 0.114 0.105 0.073 0.129 
Table 5: Regression results for the Cluster 2 statements: trends and relation with GDP growth. P-values are given in parentheses. ; 
highlighted means significant at a 5% level  
 Table 6 illustrates that higher educated consumers have a more prudent attitude 
compared to lower educated consumers when it comes to trust in professional advisors, 
although this is only significant for closers in the third quartile of 2013. Next to that, we find 
that higher educated consumers are more prudent when it comes to the involvement of friends 
and family. The higher educated recent buyers are more prudent during the crisis, whereas 
within the representative group there is hardly any difference during the crisis. Next to that, 
higher educated buyers involve more friends and family members in decision making after the 
crisis, while the representative group was significantly more prudent before and in the 
beginning of the crisis. During the crisis there is no significant difference within the 
representative group across the levels of education.  
Quarter Trust in professional advisor Asking lay advice 
 Closers Representative group Closers Representative group 
2007Q1 - (0.549) - (0.631) + (0.125) + (0.005) 
2007Q3 + (0.559) - (0.153) + (0.235) + (0.419) 
2008Q1 + (0.004) -/+ (0.999) + (0.413) - (0.054) 
2008Q3 - (0.845) + (0.076) + (0.014) + (0.968) 
2009Q1 - (0.484) - (0.913) + (0.001) - (0.480) 
2009Q3 + (0.767) + (0.493) + (0.043) + (0.911) 
2010Q1 + (0.060) + (0.404) + (0.003) + (0.125) 
2010Q3 + (0.350) + (0.958) - (0.630) + (0.950) 
2011Q1 + (0.373) + (0.041) + (0.318) + (0.087) 
2011Q3 + (0.869) - (0.911) + (0.049) + (0.669) 
2012Q1 + (0.587) + (0.111) + (0.004) - (0.241) 
2012Q3 + (0.694) -/+ (0.999) + (0.207) - (0.588) 
2013Q1 + (0.167) + (0.407) + (0.926) + (0.907) 
2013Q3 + (0.030) + (0.171) + (0.069) + (0.179) 
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Table 6: Relation between statements and education for the cluster 2 statements; + = high educated people are more prudent, - = high 
educated people are less prudent; two sided p-values are given in parentheses, highlighted = + and significant at one-sided 5% level, hatched 
= - and significant at one-sided 5% level 
 
4.3 Cluster 3 statements: product preferences 
This cluster of statements concerns the preferences for products. Table 7 suggests that recent 
buyers become less prudent whereas the representative group becomes increasingly prudent 
when it comes to looking for the best product. However, only the trend for the representative 
group is significant. Additionally, both groups are less prudent when it comes to risk taking. 
For the buyers this trend is significant, and for the representative group it is almost significant 
at a 5% level (p=0,062).  If projected GDP growth goes down, recent buyers and the 
representative group will increasingly look for the best product, but again, the effects are  not 
significant. Prudency towards product choice seems to be hardly dependent on the 
macroeconomic situation. 
 Independent variables 
  
Dependent variable 
Level of aspiration Preference products with risk 
Buyers Representative group Buyers Representative group 
Intercept 4.49 2.98 4.37 5.08 5.20 -0.08 5.11 3.72 
 (0.000) (0.086) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.924) (0.000) (0.047) 
Trend -0.01  0.03  -0.04  -0.01  
 (0.250)  (0.008)  (0.030)  (0.062)  
GDP growth  -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  0.00 
  (0.237)  (0.303)  (0.613)  (0.866) 
Autoregressive term  0.32  -0.10  1.01  0.26 
  (0.376)  (0.754)  (0.000)  (0.443) 
Lag of GDP growth  0.02  -0.01  0.03  0.00 
  (0.290)  (0.723)  (0.142)  (0.999) 
R2 0.110 0.250 0.473 0.218 0.346 0.811 0.270 0.077 
Table 7: Regression results for the Cluster 3 statements: trends and relation with GDP growth. P-values are given in parentheses. Highlighted 
means significant at a 5% level. 
Table 8 reflects that we find that higher educated buyers are more prudent when it comes to 
looking for the best product. This shows before, from 2007 Q3 onwards, and at the beginning 
of the financial crisis. However, towards the end of the crisis the differences in prudency 
between different levels of education are reduced. . Higher educated consumers in the 
representative group show a different pattern, almost with a mirror image. They have a peak 
in prudency towards the end and after the crisis. Regarding risk taking the differences are very 
small. Higher educated buyers take occasionally more risk as well as higher educated people 
from the representative group.  
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Quarter Level of aspiration Preference products with risk 
 Buyers Representative group Buyers Representative group 
2007Q1 - (0.042) + (0.453) - (0.259) + (0.699) 
2007Q3 + (0.019) - (0.723) - (0.506) - (0.063) 
2008Q1 + (0.030) + (0.618) + (0.785) + (0.062) 
2008Q3 + (0.009) + (0.001) - (0.026) + (0.605) 
2009Q1 + (0.022) + (0.247) - (0.295) + (0.497) 
2009Q3 + (0.002) + (0.095) - (0.402) + (0.904) 
2010Q1 + (0.049) + (0.004) + (0.120) + (0.363) 
2010Q3 + (0.194) + (0.083) - (0.326) + (0.063) 
2011Q1 + (0.722) + (0.004) + (0.516) + (0.024) 
2011Q3 + (0.231) + (0.166) - (0.380) - (0.642) 
2012Q1 + (0.156) + (0.063) - (0.336) + (0.903) 
2012Q3 + (0.674) + (0.014) - (0.309) - (0.421) 
2013Q1 + (0.153) + (0.372) - (0.036) + (0.801) 
2013Q3 + (0.070) + (0.025) + (0.703) + (0.689) 
Table 8: Relation between statements and education for the cluster 3 statements; + = high educated people are more prudent, - = high 
educated people are less prudent; two sided p-values are given in parentheses, highlighted = + and significant at one-sided 5% level, hatched 
= - and significant at one-sided 5% level 
 
4.4 Cluster 4 statements: sharing responsibility 
Cluster 4 concerns sharing of responsibility. Based upon previous research we should find 
that sharing responsibility is related to decisions that represent higher risks. From this we 
deduce that an increased willingness to share responsibility is related to an increasingly 
prudent attitude.  
Table 9 tells us that trends in the averages of the statements concerning sharing 
responsibility with the provider are neither positive nor negative. There is also no difference 
when we relate sharing of responsibility with the provider to GDP growth. We find that recent 
buyers become increasingly reluctant to share responsibility with governments. The 
correlation between GDP and sharing of responsibility with the government is not significant. 
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Independent variables Dependent variable 
Share responsibility with providers Share responsibility with government 
Closers Representative group Closers Representative group 
Intercept 2.81 3.47 2.83 2.61 2.75 3.60 2.76 1.97 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.071) (0.000) (0.327) 
Trend -0.00  -0.00  -0.01  0.00  
 (0.557)  (0.081)  (0.048)  (0.580)  
GDP growth  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.666)  (0.972)  (0.401)  (0.763) 
Autoregressive term  -0.24  0.07  -0.34  0.29 
  (0.448)  (0.826)  (0.464)  (0.653) 
Lag of GDP growth  0.01  -0.00  -0.00  0.00 
  (0.255)  (0.563)  (0.822)  (0.477) 
R2 0.030 0.180 0.239 0.070 0.571 0.631 0.057 0.413 
Table 9: Regression results for the Cluster 4 statements: trends and relation with GDP growth. P-values are given in parentheses. Highlighted 
means significant at a 5% level.  
We find significant differences when it comes to level of education, see Table 10. Higher 
educated people have the opinion that responsibility should be shared between them and the 
provider of financial products and services. Higher educated buyers agree with this from 2007 
until 2011 Q1, and in 2013 Q3. Within the representative group higher educated people also 
favor a shared responsibility after the crisis. The differences between higher and lower 
educated closers are less outspoken when it comes to sharing responsibility with governments. 
However, in the representative group higher educated people are much more in favor of 
sharing responsibility. Due to a lack of data we cannot comment on this aspect of attitude 
after the crisis. 
Quarter Share responsibility with providers Share responsibility with government 
 Buyers Representative group Buyers Representative group 
2007Q1 + (0.005) + (0.033) + (0.329) + (0.029) 
2007Q3 + (0.000) + (0.048)   
2008Q1 + (0.015) + (0.001) + (0.163) + (0.166) 
2008Q3 + (0.020) + (0.000) + (0.036) + (0.068) 
2009Q1 + (0.003) + (0.027) - (0.247) + (0.735) 
2009Q3 + (0.023) + (0.199) + (0.446) + (0.052) 
2010Q1 + (0.005) + (0.020) + (0.672) + (0.038) 
2010Q3 + (0.005) + (0.152) + (0.065) + (0.816) 
2011Q1 + (0.002) + (0.034) + (0.890) + (0.049) 
2011Q3 + (0.230) + (0.207)   
2012Q1 - (0.669) + (0.378)   
2012Q3 + (0.401) + (0.001)   
2013Q1 + (0.782) + (0.010)   
2013Q3 + (0.053) + (0.062)   
Table 10: Relation between statements and education for the cluster 4 statements; + = high educated people are more prudent, - = high 
educated people are less prudent; two sided p-values are given in parentheses, highlighted = + and significant at one-sided 5% level, hatched 
= - and significant at one-sided 5% level 
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4.5 Overall results 
When looking at the overall results, we find recent buyers of financial products and services 
nor the representative group to act significantly more prudent. On the contrary, six out of the 
seven significant trend patterns head towards less prudency. Only when it comes to the level 
of aspiration the representative group shows a significant tendency towards more prudency. 
Next to that, a majority of the trends does not show a significant change, both for recent 
buyers and the representative group. So, consumers hardly changed their attitudes in the focal 
period, and if they did, it was not towards more prudency. Consequently, nine out of sixteen 
times the null hypothesis regarding trends can not be rejected. Furthermore, the effects of 
changes in GDP forecasts on attitudes are non-existent. Sixteen out of sixteen times the null 
hypothesis is not rejected (see Table 11 for an overview). 
 
  Trend Relation with GDP growth 
  Buyers Representative group Buyers Representative group 
Cluster 1 Information - - - - 
 Time - - - + 
Cluster 2 Professional - - + - 
 Lay - + - + 
Cluster 3 Aspiration - + - - 
 Risk - - - + 
Cluster 4 Providers - - - - 
 Government - + - + 
Table 11: Summary of the results: Significance (at a 5% level) of trends and GDP growth in the regressions. 
The most significant differences can be found when taking the levels of education into 
account. We find that higher educated people act more prudent than the less educated. A 
significant relationship is found for 32 out of 112 cases for recent buyers, and in 49 out of 112 
cases for the representative group. Only in a very limited number of cases higher educated 
people act less prudent, 4 out of 112 for the buyers and 2 out of 112 for the representative 
group. We find that higher educated buyers are in a substantial number of cases more prudent 
when it comes to asking lay advice, that is, when they involve their friends and family in 
decision making, level of aspiration, and sharing responsibility with providers. The 
representative group shows a similar pattern for the aspiration level and providers. However, 
as the representative group assumes in more cases  more prudency, the question arises 
whether consumers only think they will be more prudent or that they will be indeed be more 
prudent when the decision is at stake (see Table 12 for an overview). 
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Quarter Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 
 Information Time Pro- 
fessional 
Lay Aspiration Risk Providers Government 
 B R B R B R B R B R B R B R B R 
2007Q1 -  -     + -    + +  + 
2007Q3         +   - + +   
2008Q1     +   - +   + + +   
2008Q3  +  +  +  +  + + -  + + + + 
2009Q1       +   +    + +   
2009Q3       +   + +   +   + 
2010Q1  +  +  +   +   + +   + +  + 
2010Q3   +        +  + +  +  
2011Q1      +   +   +  + + +  + 
2011Q3 +      +           
2012Q1       +    +       
2012Q3  +   +      +    +   
2013Q1    +        -   +   
2013Q3 +  +   +   +  +  +   +  +   
Table 12: Summary of the results (at a one-sided 5% level): Relations with education; B = recent closers, R = representative group; + = high 
educated people are more prudent, - = high educated people are less prudent 
 
5. Discussion and conclusion 
 
Our results do not seem to support the Impersonal Impact Hypothesis. This hypothesis 
suggests that  consumers who are more involved with the circumstances, because they have to 
decide within the circumstances, would be more sensitive to them, but we find that the 
differences between buyers and the representative group is small. Macroeconomic factors like 
publicly available GDP growth forecasts also have no impact. Another conclusion is that, in 
general, buyers as well as the representative group do not seem to be alarmed by the crisis. 
There is no general trend towards more prudent behaviour. Looking at the trends it is 
ambiguous whether or not consumers indeed are more prudent than they were in 2007. If any 
sign of more or less prudency is found, it concerns the link with the education level.  However, 
this prudency is concentrated before and during the crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis it is 
mostly the representative group that is more prudent, and not the recent buyers. 
A rejection or not of the Impersonal Impact Hypothesis does however not explain why 
the crisis seems to have only a minimal impact, if any at all. An explanation could be framing, 
that is, the ‘concreteness principle’. The question in this case is if individual decision makers 
did connect their personal decision at a micro level with phenomena at a macro level. This 
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could be linked to the argument that if consumers are blinded by the benefits of prospects, that 
they do lessen their critical attitude, and in this case their level of prudency. 
What we were able to confirm is that the level of education does matter. Higher 
educated people are more prudent in many cases and over time. So they link macro events in a 
different way to micro events. 
The overall conclusion of our study is that individual consumers should not be 
automatically counted upon to adjust behaviour after a financial crisis. The most convincing 
example of this is that regardless of all the critique that has been given on financial 
professionals, that the professional advisors are increasingly trusted. Also higher educated 
people are only slightly more critical towards their own professional advisors in a limited 
number of cases. So, if a more prudent attitude is wanted, other measures should be taken. 
Framing could play a role in these, as Prospect Theory has convincingly shown. Framing 
should be than such that the benefits to be gained from financial products and services are less 
ambiguous. The financial crisis allows for such a frame, but consumers do not come up with it 
themselves.  
 
 
 
